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A REEXAMINATION OF THE PUBLIC
PURPOSE DOCTRINE: NICHOLS V.
SOUTH CAROLINA RESEARCH
AUTHORITY
ARTHUR
I.

L. COLEMAN*

INTRODUCTION

An elementary principle of South Carolina law is that all
legislation must serve a public purpose.1 Although the public
purpose doctrine has been applied in many contexts, a precise
definition of the term "public purpose" has proven elusive to
courts, thereby generating uncertainty about the parameters of
the doctrine. In South Carolina, a public purpose "is a fluid
concept which changes with time, place, population, economy
and countless other circumstances. It is a reflection of the
changing needs of society."' 3 The fluid nature of the doctrine
helps explain the difficulty courts have encountered when attempting to define precisely the doctrine. Generally, however,
legislation held to serve a valid public purpose has been described as promoting "the public health, morals, general welfare,
* Attorney, Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough, Columbia, South Carolina;
B.A., 1981, The University of Virginia; J.D. 1984, Duke University.
The author gratefully expresses his thanks to the Honorable Karen L. Henderson,
United States District Judge, who not only proved to be a most worthy adversary in
Nichols v. South Carolina Research Auth., but who also selflessly offered her insights
and shared her expertise on this subject.
1. Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 86, 156 S.E.2d 421, 427 (1967).
2. The South Carolina Supreme Court has acknowledged that its public purpose
decisions "are not entirely consistent." Nichols v. South Carolina Research Auth., 290
S.C. 415, 427, 351 S.E.2d 155, 162 (1986). South Carolina courts are not alone in wrestling with the definitional problems the doctrine poses. See Note, Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond Plans, 66 HARv. L. REV. 898, 901
(1953); Note, State ConstitutionalLimitations on a Municipality's Power to Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 96
(1959). Most cases are decided on their peculiar facts and circumstances. See Anderson
v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975); 2 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§10.31 (3d ed. 1979).
3. Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869, 873
(1978) (citation omitted).
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security, prosperity, and contentment" of the residents of a
given political entity.4
Although it is undisputed that legislation must serve a public purpose, a legitimate controversy has arisen regarding the
precise public purpose standard to be applied. This controversy
gives rise to the central question addressed in this Article:
whether the public purpose standard that all legislation must
satisfy is the same standard that all legislation authorizing the
levy of taxes must satisfy.
Courts generally have acknowledged that legislation serves a
public purpose if (1) the articulated goals of the legislation are
in the furtherance of a public purpose, and (2) there is a reasonable relationship between the public purpose sought to be
achieved and the means chosen to effectuate that purpose."
When analyzing the public purpose of legislation that subjects
taxpayers to pecuniary liability, courts usually have undertaken
a more exacting scrutiny than this standard suggests. In most of
these cases, however, the courts have failed to acknowledge expressly the heightened level of judicial review.
Precise guidelines for this heightened scrutiny were never
explicitly set forth until the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Byrd v. County of Florence6 addressed the public purpose requirement in the context of the issuance of county general obligation bonds for the acquisition of an industrial park.7 In a
three-to-two opinion the court promulgated a four-part standard
for establishing the public purpose of legislation sanctioning the
levy of county ad valorem property taxes to repay a debt created
for the purpose of industrial development. The court stated that
the public purpose of this legislation should be determined by
examining: (1) the ultimate goal or benefit to the public in-

4. Id. (citing Caldwell v. McMillian, 224 S.C. 150, 157, 77 S.E.2d, 798, 801 (1953));
Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, 287 S.C. 209, 216, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Wolper, 287 S.C. at 216, 336 S.E.2d at 875; Bauer, 271 S.C. at 230-31,
246 S.E.2d at 875. The means to achieve that purpose is primarily within the discretion
of the legislature. See Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438,

327 S.E,2d 331 (1985). Courts applying this standard generally defer to the will of the
legislature. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
6. 281 S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d 804 (1984), overruled in part, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d
155 (1986).

7. A general obligation debt is defined as "any indebtedness of the political subdivision which shall be secured in whole or in part by a pledge of its full faith, credit and
taxing power." S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14(3).
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tended by the project; (2) whether public or private parties will
be the primary beneficiaries; (3) the speculative nature of the
project; and (4) the probability that the public interest will be
served and to what degree.8 Applying this standard, the court in
Byrd held an ordinance, which authorized the issuance of general obligation bonds to purchase land for industrial development, to be invalid.'
The holding in Byrd was challenged in Nichols v. South
CarolinaResearch Authority,0 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of legislation
designed to attract and promote the development of high technology industry in South Carolina. In a unanimous opinion, the
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the challenged legislation
on public purpose grounds and overruled Byrd to the extent it
held that industrial development did not constitute a valid public purpose. The court, however, reaffirmed the application of
the Byrd four-point standard to legislation which provided for
financing industrial development."
In an attempt to resolve the question concerning the public
purpose standard to be applied and, consequently, to settle the
controversy generated by Nichols, this Article will provide an
overview of the public purpose doctrine in South Carolina and
trace its evolution in conjunction with the "changing needs of
society" 12 in recent years.13 Furthermore, this Article will suggest that, while purporting to advance the liberality of the public purpose doctrine in South Carolina, the Nichols court may
have set forth a restriction on economic development legislation
which did not previously exist. To that extent, therefore, Nichols, not Byrd, may be inconsistent with the public purpose doc-

8. 281 S.C. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 806.
9. Id., 315 S.E.2d at 807.
10. 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
11. Unlike the ordinance in Byrd, the legislation in Nichols did not authorize the
levy of taxes to accomplish its public goals. For a discussion of the scope of the Nichols
holding, see infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
12. Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 227, 246 S.E. 2d 869,
873 (1978).
13. This Article focuses on the public purpose question in the context of legislation
which authorizes the issuance of bonds. Other types of legislation relevant to the public
purpose issue, but beyond the primary focus of this Article, relate to (1) eminent domain, see S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; (2) tax exemptions, see S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3; and (3)
the sale of state property for less than its full market value, see S.C. CoNsT.art. HI,§ 31.
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trine as it has been applied in South Carolina since 1884.
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE
DOCTRINE

The supreme court first addressed the public purpose doctrine in South Carolina in Feldman & Company v. City Council
of Charleston.14 In Feldman the court invalidated legislation authorizing the issuance of "fire loan bonds." These bonds were to
be loaned to fire victims in Charleston "enabling them to 'build
up and rebuild the waste places and burnt districts of the city of
Charleston, or erect improvements upon their lots.' "15 The court
in Feldman held that the legislation authorizing the levy of
taxes to pay for the bonds was unconstitutional and concluded
that "the purpose of the act ... was to aid private individuals
in carrying out private enterprises, ... although such [private]

enterprises might prove of incidental advantage to the public." ' 6
The basis for the court's opinion was two-fold. First, reasoning that the "power to issue the bonds necessarily implied the
power to levy taxes to provide for the payment thereof, ' 17 the

Feldman court concluded that the power to levy taxes was not
an unlimited power. According to Feldman, taxation, by its very
definition, required that a public purpose be served. The court
stated:
A tax is a sum of money assessed under the authority of the
State on the person or property of an individual for the use of
the State. Taxation, by the very meaning of the term, implies
the raising of money for public uses, and excludes the raising if
for private objects and purposes. 8
Second, the court construed article I, section 41 of the South
Carolina Constitution of 1868 to mandate that any exercise of a
taxation power must be for some public purpose.'
14. 23 S.C. 57 (1884).
15. Id. at 61.
16. Id. at 67.
17. Id. at 62.
18. Id. (quoting Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, 127 (1872)). In the first opinion in the
United States to address the public purpose doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
also based its holding on the premise that "[tiaxation is a mode of raising revenue for
public purposes." Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 149 (1853).
19. 23 S.C. at 62. The South Carolina Constitution of 1868 provided, in relevant
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Feldman and later cases have exhibited confusion about the
source of the public purpose doctrine. Like Feldman, many of
the first cases addressing the public purpose doctrine relied primarily, if not exclusively, on the definition of "tax" to justify the
imposition of a public purpose requirement.20 In cases in which
the levying of taxes was not at issue, courts sought to identify
the source of the public purpose requirement in the state constitution, or more generally, in "the spirit of our institutions."'"
Consistent with its uncertain origins, the fundamental public purpose requirement applicable to all legislation is now generally held to arise from article 1, section 322 of the South Carolina Constitution.23 By contrast, the public purpose requirement
inherent in the common-law definition of "tax' 24 was first codified in 1977 when article X of the South Carolina Constitution
was revised. 25 Article X, section 5 now provides:

part, that "the enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people, and all other powers not herein delegated remain
with the people." S.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 41 (1868).
This constitutional provision may explain the differing judicial interpretations regarding the power of the legislature in Feldman and in State ex rel. Copes v. Mayor of
Charleston, 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 491 (1857). In Copes the court of errors affirmed the
constitutionality of Charleston's bond issuance to buy stock in railroad companies,
stressing the broad power of the legislature: "I know no restrictions on legislative power,
which in this State is vested by the Constitution in the General Assembly, except those
which deny certain powers, or which by implication arise because certain powers are
conferred on Congress." Id. at 501. When Copes was decided, the Constitution of 1790
contained no provision comparable to article I, § 41 of the Constitution of 1868.
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Charleston C. & C. R.R. v. Whitesides, 30 S.C. 579, 9 S.E.
661 (1889).
21. McCullough v. Brown, 41 S.C. 220, 264, 19 S.E. 458, 479 (1893) (Pope, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Haesloop v. City of Charleston, 123 S.C. 272, 115 S.E. 596 (1922).
22. Article I, § 3 provides that the "privileges and immunities of citizens of this
State and of the United States under this Constitution shall not be abridged, nor shall
any person be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 3. Like S.C.
CONsT. art. I, § 41 (1868), this provision does not expressly set forth a public purpose
requirement.
23. See, e.g., Hucks v. Riley, 292 S.C. 492, 357 S.E.2d 458 (1987); State ex rel.
Medlock v. South Carolina State Family Farm Dev. Auth., 279 S.C. 316, 306 S.E.2d 605
(1983). This provision of the Constitution was first identified as the source for the public
purpose requirement applicable to all legislation in Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156
S.E.2d 921 (1967). See generally infra note 55 and accompanying text.
24. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
25. Although the current art. X, § 5 can be traced to the South Carolina Constitution of 1868, art. 1, § 37 and art. IX, § 4, the older version merely required a stated
"object" of the tax.
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No tax, subsidy or charge shall be established, fixed, laid or
levied, under any pretext whatsoever, without the consent of
the people or their representatives lawfully assembled. Any tax
which shall be levied shall distinctly state the public purpose
to which the proceeds of the tax shall be applied.2 6
Similarly, article X, section 13(3)27 states that general obligation
debt may not be incurred except for a public purpose.2 8
III. APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC PURPOSE DOCTRINE

A.

Introduction

Since the seminal opinion in Feldman, legislation that has
been held to satisfy a public purpose has related to the construction of a hospital, 29 the construction of hydroelectric plants, 30
the provision of low income housing,3 1 the construction of memorials, 32 the construction of a cafeteria in a highway department,33 the promotion of industrial development, 34 the control of
air and water pollution,3 5 the issuance of bonds to finance student loans for higher education," the development of residential
housing for low income families, 37 the construction of a grain elevator, 38 the provision of loans for low income farmers,39 the
26. S.C. CONST. art. X,
27. Id., art. X, § 13(3).

§ 5.

28. See also S.C. CONST. art. X, §§ 14(4), 15(3), which relate to the general obligation debt of political subdivisions. Under the revised Article X, revenue bonds must also
satisfy a public purpose: "The General Assembly may authorize the State or any of its
agencies, authorities or institutions to incur indebtedness for any public purpose payable
solely from a revenue-producing project or from a special source. . . ." S.C. CONST. art.
X, §13(a); cf. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14(10) (does not expressly require revenue bonds
issued by cities, counties, and special purpose districts to serve a public purpose).
29. Battle v. Wilcox, 128 S.C. 500, 122 S.E. 516 (1924).
30. Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 176 S.E. 870 (1934); Clarke v. South
Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 177 S.C. 427, 181 S.E. 481 (1935).
31. McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938).
32. Powell v. Thomas, 214 S.C. 376, 52 S.E.2d 782 (1949) (dicta).
33. Caldwell v. McMillian, 224 S.C. 150, 77 S.E.2d 798 (1953).
34. Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
35. Harper v. Schooler, 258 S.C. 486, 189 S.E.2d 284 (1972).
36. Durham v. McLeod, 259 S.C. 409, 192 S.E.2d 202 (1972).
37. Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978).
38. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mktg. Ass'n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth.,
278 S.C. 198, 293 S.E.2d 854 (1982).
39. State ex rel. Medlock v. South Carolina State Family Farm Dev. Auth., 279 S.C.
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provision of financial assistance to small businesses, 40 the development of waterfront property,4 1 the development of research
parks to attract high technology industry, 42 and the construction
of lodging and restaurants to promote tourism.4 3
By contrast, legislation that has not been held to satisfy the
public purpose requirement has related to airport improvements, 44 construction of a medical office building,4 5 development
of housing for low to moderate income families, 46 slum clearance,4 alcohol fuel development, 48 development of computer office facilities, 49 construction of shopping centers, 50 and development of an industrial park.5 '
These varying results confirm that the public goal of legislation, alone, does not always control the ultimate resolution of
whether the legislation satisfies the public purpose test. To better understand the underpinnings of these mixed results, a more
careful examination of the context in which the public purpose
challenges have arisen is necessary. An examination of cases construing legislation that has authorized the issuance of revenue
bonds (which do not involve the taxing power) and general obligation bonds (which do) provides a framework for determining
that the legislative imposition of tax liability has affected the
judicial interpretation of the public purpose doctrine.

316, 306 S.E.2d 605 (1983).
40. Carll v. South Carolina Jobs-Economic Dev. Auth., 284 S.C. 438, 327 S.E.2d 331

(1985).
41. Wolper v. City Council of Charleston, 287 S.C. 209, 336 S.E.2d 871 (1985).
42. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Auth., 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
43. Hucks v. Riley, 292 S.C. 492, 357 S.E.2d 458 (1987).
44. Gentry v. Taylor, 192 S.C. 145, 5 S.E.2d 857 (1939).
45. Jacobs v. McClain, 262 S.C. 425, 205 S.E.2d 172 (1974).
46. Casey v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 264 S.C. 303, 215 S.E.2d 184 (1975)
(by implication); cf. Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d
869 (1978) (court upheld constitutionality of statute, stating that it served a public purpose even though benefits accrued to beneficiary classes in the form of privately owned
homes).

47. Anderson v. Baehr, 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
48. State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 276 S.C. 323, 278 S.E.2d 612 (1981).

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d 804 (1984), overruled in
part, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
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B. Revenue Bonds
Revenue bonds are payable only from the income of projects
erected or constructed with the proceeds of the bond issue.2
Holders of these bonds can maintain no claim upon funds to be
raised by taxation to secure payment of their obligations."
The leading case in South Carolina addressing the public
purpose doctrine as applied to county revenue bonds is Elliott v.
McNair. 4 In Elliott the court held that the Industrial Revenue
Bond Act, which authorized financing incentives to promote industrial development, satisfied the public purpose requirement
of article I, section 5.55 The court examined the legislation in an
effort to determine if the legislature had been "clearly wrong" in
its public purpose findings. 6 Affirming the "established legislative policy" 57 of industrial expansion, the Elliott court confirmed
that the public purpose determination was primarily vested with
the legislature.58
This presumption in favor of legislation's validity has been
confirmed in similar cases, even when, as in Elliott, private entities have benefited incidentally from the enactment. For instance, in State ex rel. Medlock v. South CarolinaFamily Farm
Development Authority,59 the court upheld the Family Farm
Development Act, which authorized the issuance of revenue
bonds to provide loans to low and moderate income farmers,
even though benefits accrued primarily to a specific segment of
the state's population. Similarly, in Carll v. South CarolinaJobs

52. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 2, § 43.11.
53. Id.
54. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
55. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1895). That provision is now contained in article I, § 3.
See supra note 22. The concept of industrial revenue bonds-in 1967 a relatively new
idea-is illustrated in Elliott, in which a private company acquired a tract of land to
establish its business in South Carolina. After acquiring the land, the company conveyed

the tract of land to Richland County, which was to issue revenue bonds to pay for the
land and finance the construction of the facilities. The facilities and the land were then

to be leased back to the private company. The reduced rate of interest from the taxexempt financing of municipal bonds would make the undertaking by the private com-

pany economically feasible.
56. 250 S.C. at 88, 156 S.E.2d at 428.
57. Id. at 89, 156 S.E.2d at 428.
58. Id. at 88, 156 S.E.2d at 428; see also Park v. Greenwood County, 174 S.C. 35, 41,
176 S,E. 870, 872 (1934).
59. 279 S.C. 316, 306 S.E.2d 605 (1983).
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Economic Development Authority, ° the court upheld legislation
authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds. The court concluded
that the legislation designed to further business development in
South Carolina was clearly supported by "detailed and comprehensive" legislative findings and that its provisions were reasonably related to its goals.6 1 Most recently, in Hucks v. Riley, e2 the
court upheld legislation authorizing the issuance of county industrial revenue bonds to finance the construction of public
lodging and restaurant facilities. Based on a finding that tourism, the second largest industry in the state, would benefit by
the legislation, the court held that the resulting economic improvement justified the legislation.6
A notable exception to this line of cases is Anderson v.
Baehr 4 in which the court held that legislation with the aim of
"slum clearance and redevelopment" did not serve a public purpose.6 5 Under the legislation addressed in Anderson, South Carolina taxpayers were not faced with the possibility of a levy of
taxes to pay for the proposed housing and building redevelopment. Nonetheless, the legislation failed to pass the constitutional challenge because the Act lacked specific public purpose
findings. 6 Although the legislation in Anderson fell "on the
wrong side of the border, ' 67 Anderson is not inconsistent with
Elliott and its progeny. Indeed, Anderson suggests that if, as in
Elliott, the legislature had identified precisely the public purpose to be accomplished, along with a rational means to achieve

60. 284 S.C. 438, 327 S.E.2d 331 (1985).
61. Id. at 443, 327 S.E.2d at 334.
62. 292 S.C. 492, 357 S.E.2d 458 (1987).
63. Id. at 494, 357 S.E.2d at 459.
64. 265 S.C. 153, 217 S.E.2d 43 (1975).
65. Id. at 162-63, 217 S.E.2d at 47-48.
66. The court noted that "the legislature has not spelled out a public purpose [and]
the answer of the city has not, except in a general way, plead [sic] a public purpose." Id.
at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 47. The court also observed: "[tihat which the city and/or developer
proposes to do specifically is not indicated in the record." Id. at 161, 217 S.E.2d at 47.
The court further indicated a reluctance to uphold the challenged legislation absent clear
public purpose findings because the legislation permitted the taking of private property
by eminent domain. Compare State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 276 S.C. 323, 332, 278
S.E.2d 612, 617 (1981) (per curiam) (legislation providing for the financing of computer
and office facilities and shopping centers would "solve no problems confronted by substantial numbers of the public").
67. 265 S.C. at 161, 217 S.E.2d at 46.
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that end, the legislation would have been upheld."
C. General Obligation Bonds
Unlike revenue bonds, general obligation bonds are payable
from funds provided by taxation. When general obligation bonds
are issued, the full faith and taxing power of the government
entity is pledged as security." In cases in which the legislation
has authorized the pledge of the taxing power, the supreme
court has rigorously reviewed the legislation, and has often held
such legislation unconstitutional."0
In Bolton v. Wharton,7 ' for instance, the court considered a
taxpayer challenge to the city of Union's use of general obligation bonds issued to underwrite stock in a proposed silk manufacturing company. Holding that the obligations, which were to
be secured by the taxing power of the city of Union, were "not
issued for a valid corporate purpose, ' 7 2 the court emphasized:

'The power given to the city council to issue bonds, so as to
bind not only all the taxpayers of the city, but their children as
well, is a very high confidence and trust, and can be properly
exercised for no other purpose than "for the public use of the
[city] . .

.

.

Similarly, in Casey v. South Carolina State Housing Authority74 the supreme court addressed the constitutionality of
legislation authorizing the issuance of notes or bonds to promote
housing accommodations for persons of moderate to low income.
The court in Casey held that the mortgage loan and mortgage
purchase programs at issue unconstitutionally pledged the credit
of the state because the act establishing those programs established a guaranty fund composed of future tax revenues from

68, See generally supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69, See supra note 7.
70, See, e.g., supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.

71, 163 S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454 (1930).
72. Id. at 250, 161 S.E. at 457.
73. Id. at 249-50, 161 S.E. at 457 (quoting Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 33
S.C.L. 24, 11 S.E. 434, 438 (1890)); see also Jacobs v. McClain, 262 S.C. 425, 205 S.E.2d
172 (1974) (statute authorizing hospital district to issue general obligation bonds to fi-

nance construction of offices to be leased by physicians unconstitutional because such
buildings are not "public").
74. 264 S.C. 303, 215 S.E.2d 184 (1975).
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which the state treasurer was statutorily required to pay any
deficit incurred by the Housing Authority. 5 Although the court
in Casey did not expressly address the public purpose of the
Act, the import of the Casey holding was that the Act failed to
76
serve the requisite public purpose'
In State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley,77 the supreme court invalidated legislation which authorized the issuance of general obligation bonds to finance an alcohol fuel development loan program. Acknowledging that "a properly tailored legislative
enactment seeking to promote the development of fuel alcohol
by government entities"7 8 might serve a public purpose, the
court found that the "indirect and speculative nature"7 9 of the
public purpose rendered the legislation constitutionally defective
under article X, sections 11 and 13(3).8o
Striving to clarify the court's position on the question of
public purpose in the context of general obligation debt, a three-

75. Article X, § 11 of the South Carolina Constitution, which provides that the
"credit of neither the state nor any of its political subdivision shall be pledged or loaned
for the benefit of any individual, company, association, corporation, or any religious or
private education institution" has generally been interpreted to relate "solely to general
obligation bonds payable from the proceeds of ad valorem tax levies." Carl, 284 S.C. at
443-44, 327 S.E.2d at 335. This constitutional proscription does not bar the pledging of
the credit of the state or its subdivisions if the challenged legislation serves a public
purpose. See, e.g., South Carolina Farm Bureau Mktg. Ass'n v. South Carolina State
Ports Auth., 278 S.C. 198, 293 S.E.2d 854 (1982).
76. Three years after the Casey opinion, in Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous.
Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978), the same general legislative scheme was held
to be constitutional in all respects. In Bauer the supreme court stated that Casey had
invalidated the legislation "on the ground that it constituted a pledge of the state's
credit for the benefit of the private sector in violation of the state constitution." Id. at
223, 246 S.E.2d at 871. The Bauer court distinguished the legislation in Casey and found
that, unlike "the previous enactments, which had as their intended beneficiaries only
persons and families of moderate to low income, the 1977 act also includes persons and
families of low income as beneficiaries. And, for the first time, a precise definition of the
beneficiary classes is contained in the legislation." Id. at 224, 246 S.E.2d at 872. Significantly, Justice Gregory, concurring in the result, expressly acknowledged that the "same
basic scheme employed by the 1974 act [addressed in Casey]. . . was declared to serve a
private purpose. Today, it is determined to serve a public purpose." Id. at 237, 246
S.E.2d at 878-79 (Gregory, J., concurring). Concluding that the Act in Bauersatisfied the
public purpose requirement, Gregory stated that the constitutional impediment to funding the project with tax revenues, present in Casey, had been removed. Id. at 237, 246
S.E.2d at 879. (Gregory, J., concurring).
77. 276 S.C. 323, 328, 278 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1981).
78. Id. at 330, 278 S.E.2d at 616.
79. Id. at 329, 278 S.E.2d at 615.
80. Id. at 329-30, 278 S.E.2d at 615-16; see also supra note 66.
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justice majority in Byrd v. County of Florence8 ' struck down the
use of general obligation bonds by a political subdivision as violative of article X, section 14(4) of the South Carolina Constitution. 2 In Byrd the court addressed the constitutionality of a
county ordinance permitting the issuance of general obligation
bonds to be used by Florence County to purchase a tract of land.
The ordinance provided for the development of an industrial
park on the purchased property that would be sold or leased to
private industry. The purpose of the legislation was to promote
industrial development and to create jobs in an economically depressed area.83
For the first time in its history, a majority of the court explicitly set forth a precise and more rigorous standard for determining whether legislation subjecting taxpayers to additional
taxes satisfied a public purpose. Expressly recognizing the distinction between general obligation and revenue bonds, the Byrd
majority adopted Justice Harwell's dissent in State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley."4 The court stated: "[O]ne of the relevant and logical considerations is the source of repayment [of the obligation].
A distinction is justified. In revenue bonds, taxpayers can not
[sic] lose. In general obligation bonds, taxpayers may lose
much."8 5
In view of the possible financial liability of Florence County
taxpayers under the ordinance, the court articulated a fourpoint test for reviewing legislation authorizing general obligation
debt. The court stated that the following factors should be analyzed: (1) the ultimate goal or benefit to the public intended by
the project; (2) whether public or private parties will be the pri81. 281
155 (1986).

S.C. 402, 315 S.E.2d 804

(1984), overruled in part, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d

82. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 14(4) provides that general obligation debt may be incurred
"only for a purpose which is a public purpose and which is a corporate purpose of the
applicable political subdivision."
83. See FLORENCE COUNTY S.C., COUNTY COUNCIL ORDINANCE no. 14-82/83, at 5; Constitutional Law, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 37 S.C.L. REV. 47 (1985).
84, 276 S.C. 323, 333, 278 S.E.2d 612, 617 (1981).
85. 281 S.C. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 805. The observation that Byrd was rarely cited
and never applied prior to the Nichols opinion, see State and Local Government, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 39 S.C.L. REV. 161, 163 (1987), can be easily explained. Between 1984, when the Byrd decision was rendered, and 1986, when the Nichols challenge was addressed, no case concerning the public purpose of legislation which

authorized the imposition of general obligation debt was addressed by the South Carolina Supreme Court.
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mary beneficiaries; (3) the speculative nature of the project; and
(4) the probability that the public interest will be ultimately
served and to what degree."
The Byrd majority concluded that the nature of the proposed development was speculative because the park was not
clearly defined and no purchaser or tenant had been identified. 7
The court also reasoned that "the primary beneficiaries, if any,
of this project would be private businesses,"8 8 concluding that
the ordinance impermissibly permitted the County to promote
some businesses which would compete with other businesses
that would not receive the financial benefits provided by the
ordinance.8 9
D.

Summary

South Carolina courts have recognized, even if they have
not always articulated, different levels of public purpose scrutiny
applicable to legislation, depending on whether the legislation
has authorized the levy of taxes.9 0 In nontax cases the statutory
examination based on article I, section 3 of the South Carolina
Constitution has compelled only limited judicial review. In those
cases, a clear legislative statement setting forth the statute's
public purpose, along with a reasonable means for implementing
that public purpose, have been sufficient to withstand consitutional attack. In cases in which the statute has authorized a levy
of taxes, the supreme court has more closely scrutinized the leg-

86.

281 S.C. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 806.
87. The parties stipulated that "the industries to be located in the park [were] unknown and indefinite, and no commitments or contracts by any industry to locate within
the park [had] been made." Id., 315 S.E.2d at 806-07.
88. Id., 315 S.E.2d at 807.
89. Id. at 407, 315 S.E.2d at 806-07. In a vigorous dissent, Justice (and later Chief
Justice) Ness asserted that the act was fundamentally identical to the legislation upheld
in Elliott, and that, consequently, the Elliott holding should have governed the Byrd
decision. Taking issue with the idea that taxpayer liability should relate to the public
purpose issue, he also posited that the aim and implementation of the county ordinance
was no different from that of a specific provision of the Home Rule Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§4-9-30(5) (Law. Co-op. 1986). 281 S.C. at 408-09, 315 S.E.2d at 807-08 (Ness, J.,
dissenting).
90. The contrasting results achieved in Casey v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth.,
264 S.C. 303, 215 S.E.2d 184 (1975) and in Bauer v. South Carolina State Hous. Auth.,
271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978) most vividly confirm this distinction. See supra note
76 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1988

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

islation, often examining the speculative nature of the goal to be
furthered by the act or more carefully analyzing the true nature
of public purpose set forth in the act.
The divergence of these standards of review may have been
erased in 1986, however, when the South Carolina Supreme
Court issued its opinion in Nichols v. South Carolina Research
Authority.9
IV.

NICHOLS V. SOUTH CAROLINA RESEARCH AUTHORITY

A.

Background

In Nicholse2 the supreme court addressed the constitutionality of legislation establishing the South Carolina Research Authority for the purpose of attracting high technology industry to
South Carolina. Under that legislation 93 the primary means of
attracting such industry was the development of research parks
near university centers. Pursuant to the act, the state deeded
the Research Authority four tracts of land in fee simple, each
near major research and education centers in South Carolina.9 "
The Act authorized the Research Authority to construct, operate, and maintain the research parks and related facilities. The
Authority was also permitted to issue revenue bonds to further
the purposes of the act.
The Authority stipulated that, as part of its effort to attract
high technology industry to South Carolina, it intended to provide financial incentives to high technology industries.9 5 These
incentives included mortgaging land received from the state,
purchasing equipment, and selling and leasing land to high technology industries.9 6 Negotiations between the Authority and
eleven high technology industries interested in locating in the
Authority's research parks were ongoing, and two of these industries had reached the final phases of negotiations with the Research Authority. Each of the eleven industries was projected to
employ approximately twenty-five individuals at the beginning

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
Id.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§13-17-10 to -170 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
Record at 15-16.
Id. at 17.
Id.
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of its operations."
B.

Resolution by the Lower Court

The plaintiff in Nichols conceded that the legislation at issue satisfied the public purpose requirement of article I, section
3,98 but contended, nonetheless, that the legislation could not
withstand the more exacting scrutiny required of legislation that
required the pledge of the state's credit and potential loss of
taxpayer revenues. The plaintiff argued that the legislation did
not pass constitutional muster because (1) the act permitted the
pledge of the state's credit in violation of article X, section 11,
and (2) the act failed to satisfy the corresponding public purpose
requirement imposed on legislation authorizing the levy of taxes.
In response, the Authority contended that the legislation did not
pledge the state's credit and that, even if the mortgaging of state
property could be construed to be a pledge of the state's credit,
the legislation satisfied the public purpose mandate of Byrd.99
The lower court in Nichols held that the legislation served a
public purpose under article I, section 3.100 The court reasoned
that the legislation was designed to serve a public purpose and
the means chosen to achieve its public goals were rationally related to those ends. The lower court also observed that the incidental benefit to private industry did not invalidate the act.1" 1
The court, however, held that a more rigorous public purpose
examination was required because the act empowered the Authority to mortgage or otherwise encumber its property. 02 Con-

97. Id. at 17-18.
98. Id. at 23. See generally supra note 22 and accompanying text.
99. The parties also disputed the constitutionality of the provision in the act which
did not require adherence to the Advanced Refunding Act. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-21-10
to -80 (Law. Co-op. 1986). In addition, the Nichols challenge raised the questions of
whether the Research Authority could sell its property at less than full market value and
whether it could enter into joint ventures with private industry. The supreme court affirmed the lower court's order on these issues and concluded that: (1) the provision of
the act which failed to require adherence to the Advanced Refunding Act constituted
special legislation in violation of S.C. CONsT. art. III, § 34(IX); (2) the Authority could
sell its property at less than full market value under S.C. CONsT. art. III, § 31, as long as
public benefits would result from the sale; and (3) S.C. CONST. art. X, § 11 prohibited the
contemplated joint ventures with private industry.
100. Record at 23-28.
101. Id. at 27-28.
102. Justifying the heightened standard of review, the court reasoned that the mort-
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sequently, the court ruled that the act did not satisfy the public
purpose scrutiny demanded by the four-part standard of Byrd.
The court determined that the public benefits resulting from
mortgages or other encumbrances of property were speculative
and that the primary beneficiary of the contemplated mortgaging of property would be private industry. 10 3 Unwilling tQ risk
the foreclosure of 1,500 acres of state property for the development of high technology industry in South Carolina, the court
concluded:
If the financing of research parks serves a public purpose at all,
it does so, as in Elliott, "barely above the border" and only
because bonds which do not constitute general obligation debt
will be issued. But with the addition of a pledge of the state's
credit through the mortgaging of all authority property to secure those bonds, the financing, as in Byrd, "falls barely, if not
greatly, below the border."''
C.

The Appeal: Byrd Overruled

On appeal to the supreme court, the Authority pressed the
same arguments it made before the lower court and also contended that the lower court had erroneously applied the Byrd
test. The Authority argued alternatively that Byrd should be
overruled if the supreme court concluded that the lower court's
Byrd analysis was correct. 05 The supreme court in Nichols upheld the act'0 0 and reversed the lower court's finding that the act
impermissibly pledged the state's credit. The court held that the
mortgage of a known quantifiable asset, which imposed no potential present or future taxpayer liability, would not violate the
proscription of article X, section 11.107
After concluding that the act neither pledged the state's
credit nor resulted in possible taxpayer liability, the court, in
dicta, addressed the public purpose question and seized the op-

gaging of state property effectively created a general obligation debt under S.C. CONST.
art. X, § 13(2). See Record at 35-36.
103. Id. at 39.
104. Id. at 40-41 (quoting Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C. 402, 407, 315 S.E.2d
804, 806 (1984)).
105. See Brief of Appellants at 27.
106. See also supra note 99.
107. 290 S.C. 415, 419-21, 351 S.E.2d 155, 158 (1986). See generally supra note 75.
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portunity to overrule Byrd. 10 Instrumental in the court's analy-

sis was its broad construction of Byrd, which the Nichols court
determined had effectively nullified at "state, county and municipal levels any legislation which authorizes the expenditure of
public funds for industrial development." 10 91 Under the Nichols
court's interpretation, Byrd held "that industrial development
does not pass constitutional muster as a 'public purpose' within
the meaning of S. C. Const. Art. X, §14(4)." '11

In overruling Byrd, the court in Nichols reexamined the record in Byrd and observed that at the time of the Byrd opinion,
the Florence County economy was underdeveloped. With 6,000
persons unemployed, the unemployment rate in Florence
County was greater than the overall rate in the state. The court
also took note of the drastic drop in the per capita income in
Florence County, relative to other counties in South Carolina. It
further recognized that only three new industries had located in
Florence County in ten years. Finally, concurring with the Byrd
dissent, the court observed that the financing proposed in Byrd
was the equivalent of the General Assembly's practice of expending revenues for the State Development Board to use."11
Reaffirming the principle set forth in Bauer v. South Carolina State Housing Authority,"2 that "the mere fact that benefits will accrue to private individuals or entities does not destroy
public purpose,"11 3 the court concluded:
It would be anomalous to hold that a government which expends hundreds of millions to alleviate the suffering of its indigent population through multiple social and humanitarian pro108. Once the issue regarding the pledge of the state's credit was resolved in favor of
the Authority, no issue regarding the public purpose of the legislation remained. All parties agreed that the lesser standard required by article I, § 3 was satisfied by the legislation. Record at 23.

109. 290 S.C. at 423, 351 S.E.2d at 160.
110. Id. A close reading of Byrd suggests, however, that the Byrd majority did not
render such a comprehensive opinion. In Byrd, the majority engaged in a fact-specific
inquiry prior to concluding that the contemplated project would be speculative and that
primary beneficiaries of the project would be private businesses. 281 S.C. at 405-07, 315
S.E.2d at 805-07. Furthermore, the distinction between the legislation challenged in Elliott v. McNair and the Florence County ordinance at issue in Byrd, a distinction expressly acknowledged by the Byrd majority, appears to refute the Nichols court's sweeping construction of Byrd.
111. 290 S.C. at 427-28, 351 S.E.2d at 161-62.
112. 271 S.C. 219, 246 S.E.2d 869 (1978).
113. 290 S.C. at 428, 351 S.E.2d at 161.
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grams, and properly so, is proscribed from providing jobs for
the unemployed, who, once employed, contribute tax revenues
in support of those very programs.114
Although it rejected the Byrd majority opinion, the Nichols
court approved as "reasonable" the four-part standard articulated in Byrd as the proper inquiry "by which a particular statute for financing industrial development should be tested for
constitutionality."11' 5
V.

CONCLUSION

The courts must now face the difficulty of construing the
Nichols holding and applying it within the public purpose realm.
By choosing to re-evaluate the validity of the Byrd holding
in a case which did not concern general obligation debt, the supreme court established a justification for reading Nichols
broadly and for thereby concluding that the Byrd four-point
analysis is applicable to any bond legislation challenged on public purpose grounds, regardless of whether that legislation permits the imposition of taxpayer liability. Furthermore, the Nichols rejection of Byrd, based on the inconsistency between Byrd
and116Bauer v. South Carolina Housing Development Authority, and based on the Byrd dissent'" suggests that the court
in Nichols may have embraced fully Justice Ness's conclusion
that the issues of public purpose and taxpayer liability are
unrelated.""
It is not clear, however, that the supreme court in Nichols
erased the distinction between the standard applicable to legislation that authorizes taxation and the standard applicable to
legislation that prohibits the imposition of taxpayer liability. If,
as the dicta of Nichols indicates, the four-point standard formulated in Byrd applies only to "acts of the General Assembly or
its political subdivisions which expend public funds for indus-

114. Id. at 429, 351 S.E.2d at 163.
115. Id.
116. Id. Bauer, which did not involve general obligation debt, is discussed more
fully at supra notes 37 and 76 and accompanying texts.
117. 290 S.C. at 428, 351 S.E.2d at 162.
118. See Byrd v. County of Florence, 281 S.C. 402, 408, 315 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Ness,
J., dissenting), overruled in part, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986).
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trial development,"1'19 then this standard applies only when taxpayers are subjected to possible pecuniary liability. Moreover, a
convergence of the different standards of public purpose review
belies the stated goal of the Nichols court: "[T]o broaden the
scope of activities which may be classed as involving a public
20
purpose.'
The supreme court's recent decision in Hfucks v. Riley further supports a narrow reading of Nichols on the public purpose
issue.121 In Hucks the court upheld an amendment to the Industrial Development Bond Act which authorized the issuance of
industrial revenue bonds to finance the acquisition of public
lodging and restaurant facilities. 2 2 The court cited Nichols only
for the proposition that "the current trend is to broaden the
scope of those activities which serve a public purpose, and legislation is not for a private purpose merely because private parties
may be benefited."' 2 The failure of the Hucks court to address
the application of the four-point standard affirmed in Nichols
suggests that standard is applicable only in cases addressing legislation authorizing the imposition of taxpayer liability.
Regardless of the construction of Nichols, however, one fact
is certain: the distinction South Carolina courts previously employed when evaluating the public purpose of legislation has
been called into question. To help resolve the imprecision inherent in the public purpose analysis, it is incumbent on the courts
to set forth more clearly the parameters governing application of
the public purpose doctrine. Although to a large extent the caseby-case analysis reflected in the opinions addressing the public

119. 290 S.C. at 430, 351 S.E.2d at 163 (emphasis added). The applicability of the
Byrd standard has been at issue only when legislation designed to promote industrial
development has been challenged. The opinion in Nichols and the majority opinion in
Byrd suggest, however, that the heightened scrutiny is justified in other contexts, as well,
separate and apart from whether the four-point standard is limited to cases addressing
legislation that allows for the imposition of taxpayer liability. See also State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 276 S.C. 323, 340, 278 S.E.2d 612, 621 (1981) (Harwell, J., dissenting).
120. 290 S.C. at 425, 351 S.E.2d at 161. If the four-point standard applies to all
bond legislation, whether or not the legislation imposes taxpayer liability, then legislation that was previously subject to the more limited review, see supra notes 54-63 and
accompanying text, will be governed by the more rigorous Byrd standard.
121. 292 S.C. 492, 357 S.E.2d 458 (1987).
122. The Act did not allow for the imposition of taxpayer liability. See S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-29-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
123. 292 S.C. at 493-94, 357 S.E.2d at 459.
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purpose issue is unavoidable," 4 the court can reduce the confusion surrounding the public purpose doctrine with pronouncements more clearly identifying the standards to be applied and
with guidelines precisely identifying the contexts in which those
standards apply.
Specifically, the courts should reaffirm the previously recognized distinct standards of review relevant to the public purpose
issue. If courts are to consider the "peculiar circumstances" relevant to each legislative enactment, then "one of the relevant and
logical considerations is the source of the repayment. [A] distinction . . . is justified. In revenue bonds, taxpayers can not

[sic] lose. In general obligation bonds, taxpayers may lose
much.

'125

In determining the constitutionality of legislation, the

role of the judiciary is a limited one. "[A]ll reasonable doubt
'
must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of [an] act."126
Yet, courts also have a "solemn duty' 1 27 to declare an act uncon-

stitutional when the act is clearly unconstitutional. To strike the
proper balance in upholding these principles, the judiciary's role
as safeguarder of individual rights and liberties justifies a more
demanding review of legislation when that legislation more directly affects the liabilities of citizens-taxpayers-of the state.

124. "Public and private interests are so commingled in many cases that it is difficult to determine which predominates.
" 1 COOLEY ON TAXATION, § 175 (4th ed.
1924).
125. 281 S.C. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 805.
126. State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 276 S.C. 323, 327, 278 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1981); see
also Elliott v. McNair, 250 S.C. 75, 84, 156 S.E.2d 421, 426 (1967).
127. State ex rel. Edwards v. Osborne, 195 S.C. 295, 11 S.E.2d 260 (1940).
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